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Out of Sight, Out of Mind:  




This article investigates the recently passed Bill C-83, which aims to reduce harms 
caused by segregating people with mental health issues. In order to assess the capacity of 
the Bill to support meaningful change, the history of mental health institutions and 
correctional facilities in Ontario is first explored, followed by an analysis of recent cases 
on segregation and mental health in the province. Next, legislative oversight for federal 
prisons and provincial jails is described, followed by an overview of ongoing reforms. 
Here, a distinction between federal prisons and provincial jails is made in order to 
explore the different legislation governing each of these spaces and the complexities that 
arise from multiple systems of governance. Finally, the practical implementation of Bill 
C-83 is considered within these legal frameworks, and the resultant consequences are 
suggested in light of academic research on prison law policy and reform.  
 
 




IN DECEMBER OF 2018, AN INQUEST INTO THE DEATH of Cas Geddes commenced. Geddes, 
who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, was detained by police for uttering threats and taken 
to the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) after no beds could be made available in the 
city’s mental health facility. As is often the case, when people living with mental health issues 
are deemed dangerous and are unable to be properly supported by existing social services, police 
resort to incarceration as a preventative measure to diminish the risk that may be presented by 
the individual. Geddes was placed in administrative segregation (or solitary confinement)1 
shortly after his arrival to OCDC, despite an existing Ontario Human Rights Tribunal Order 
prohibiting the use of segregation for prisoners with diagnosed mental health issues.2 In the 
 
 Lydia Dobson is a prison abolitionist and founding member of the Toronto Prisoners’ Project and the 
Criminalization and Punishment Education Project. She holds a Masters in Sociology from Carleton University and 
is currently completing her third year of the JD program at Osgoode Hall Law School. As will become clear, there 
have been significant developments in the regulation of the use of solitary confinement in Canada, particularly since 
2013. The research for this article was largely completed by the spring of 2019, however updates on the status to the 
two key Bills explored here are included, as well as an update on a significant decision of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal.   
1 The terms “(administrative) segregation” and “solitary confinement” will be used interchangeably throughout this 
article, despite “segregation” being the more widely accepted legal term. This is done intentionally in an effort to 
resist the capacity for similar conditions of confinement to be re-branded under different legal names. This decision 
was inspired by a question that arose in a legal conference on the issue, attended by a person who had been 
incarcerated for many years: part way through a discussion on “segregation,” he asked whether the experts at the 
table were talking about solitary confinement. If we cannot speak in terms accessible to those impacted by them, we 
should question and adjust how we use them.   
2 Ontario Human Rights Commission, Public Statement, “Segregation and mental health in Ontario’s prisons: Jahn v 
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services” (25 August 2020), online: <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/segregation-
and-mental-health-ontario’s-prisons-jahn-v-ministry-community-safety-and-correctional> [perma.cc/9GGL-BD5J]. 
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hours following Geddes’ release from solitary confinement into the general population of the jail, 
he died by suicide.3 Sadly, Geddes’ death is representative of an ongoing trend of human rights 
violations in Ontario carceral institutions.4 Although past policy reforms have led to more 
frequent mental health assessments for those in segregation, this added procedural layer has not 
substantially changed the numbers of people with mental health issues being placed into 
segregation.5 Rather, as some have argued, reforms of this nature may actually facilitate 
legitimization of the use of solitary confinement for prisoners with mental health issues.6 Recent 
publicity on this and other major cases in Canada7 has seen increased public pressure for more 
drastic alternatives to segregation.8 To this end, a federal Bill (C-83), which received Royal 
Assent on 21 June 2019, amends the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to “eliminate” the 
use of administrative and disciplinary segregation.9 While some experts have declared that the 
amendments could, if implemented properly, “end solitary confinement in Canada,”10 others 
have doubted their capacity for change, deeming the new reforms as having created conditions of 
confinement which are simply “solitary by another name.”11   
This article seeks to determine the capacity of the recently passed Bill C-83 to reduce 
harms caused by segregating people with mental health issues and to examine the potential 
consequences of the implementation of the Bill. In order to achieve this, the history of mental 
health institutions and correctional facilities in Ontario is first explored, followed by an analysis 
of recent cases on segregation and mental health in the province. Next, legislative oversight for 
federal prisons and provincial jails is described, followed by an overview of ongoing reforms. 
Here, a distinction between federal prisons, which house those who have received a sentence of 
two years or longer, and provincial jails, which are used to detain people awaiting trial or serving 
a sentence of less than two years, is made in order to explore the different legislation governing 
each of these spaces. Notably, the majority of prisoners who are held in provincial jails (as was 
 
3 Blair Crawford, “Mentally ill Geddes ‘thrown in with the wolves’ at Ottawa jail, inmate tells inquest,” Ottawa 
Citizen (12 December 2018), online: <ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/geddes-thrown-into-the-wolves-at-
ottawa-jail-inmate-tells-inquest> [perma.cc/DXR6-2QTW]. 
4 Howard Sapers et al, “Segregation in Ontario: Independent Review of Ontario Corrections” (March 2017), online: 
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/IndependentReviewOntarioCorrections/IndependentReviewOntario
CorrectionsSegregationOntario.html#seguse> [perma.cc/U856-4E97]. 
5 See Appendix A which outlines the reforms to the mental health oversight of persons in solitary confinement 
introduced in 2013, and which are still in effect today. Note that Geddes’ death occurred under this regime.  
Ongoing reports from OCDC demonstrate that the use of segregation has not, however decreased. See “Ottawa-
Carleton Detention Centre Quarterly Reports” (7 September 2018), online: 
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/OCDCTaskForceReportback.html> [perma.cc/EW9A-B3X2].  
6 Justin Piché, “Bill C-83: The End of the Line for Segregation in Federal Penitentiaries in Canada?” Tracking the 
Politics of Criminalization and Punishment in Canada (22 November 2018): <http://tpcp-
canada.blogspot.com/2018/11/bill-c-83-end-of-line-for-segregation.html> [perma.cc/335G-VU76]. 
7 The Adam Capay case, Brazeau class action, and Christina Jahn decisions will be discussed in the following 
section of this article, elaborating on these circumstances. 
8 Piché, supra note 6.  
9 C-83, An Act to amend the Correctional and Conditional Release Act and another Act, SC 2019, c27. 
10 Lisa Kerr, “If implemented properly, new bill may end solitary confinement in Canada,” Globe and Mail (18 
October 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-if-implemented-properly-new-bill-may-end-
solitary-confinement-in/> [perma.cc/3JYP-9FLK]. 
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Geddes) are on remand, meaning that they are legally innocent and awaiting trial.12 Finally, the 
practical implementation of Bill C-83 is considered within these legal frameworks, and the 
resultant consequences of these processes are suggested in light of academic research on prison 
law policy and reform. Specifically, Bill 6, a transformative Bill for Ontario-based jail 
governance, is assessed alongside the overlapping reforms of Bill C-83, impacting federal 
Ontario-based prisons.   
 
I. MENTAL HEALTH AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT   
In the early 1980s, a trend in deinstitutionalization of psychiatric and mental health facilities took 
place across Canada. Although not without its own shortcomings, under the framework of 
institutionalization, people diagnosed with mental health issues were far less likely to be 
criminalized.13 Scholars have long since documented deinstitutionalization and the 
“displacement of mental health cases into the criminal justice system.”14 Rather than providing 
services that could support people living will mental health issues, government funds have been 
increasingly directed towards carceral institutions used for punishment.15 The result is high rates 
of mental health issues within Canadian prisons and jails.16 For example, in 2016, OCDC 
reported that 50 per cent of women and 28 per cent of men entering the jail had been flagged 
with mental health alerts.17 For the growing population of prisoners18 with mental health issues, 
the use of solitary confinement is a pressing concern.19 Legal frameworks governing solitary 
confinement in Ontario provide broad discretion with limited oversight.20 In provincial jails, for 
 
12 For statistical data on remand facilities across Canada and an analysis of the causes and implications of the high 
rates of pre-trial detention see: Statistics Canada, “Adult and Youth Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2017/2018” (9 
May 2019), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00010-eng.html> [perma.cc/V8YH-
MGZA]. 
13 Many of the institutions which have long since been shut down continue to face litigation for abuses of mentally 
ill persons which took place within them. See, e.g. Carol Goar, “Ugly secret of Ontario psychiatric hospitals won’t stay 
hidden,” Toronto Star (13 December, 2013), online: 
<www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/06/07/ugly_secret_of_ontario_psychiatric_hospitals_wont_stay_hidden_goar.
html> [perma.cc/2QG9-DMLF]. 
14 Sara Johnson, “Custodial Remand in Canada,” Statistics Canada – Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE, Vol 23, no 7 
(2001), online: <publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE/0070385-002-XIE.pdf>. 
15 For carceral expansion see the blog created by Professor Justin Piché, “Tracking Carceral Punishment in Canada,” 
online: <tpcp-canada.blogspot.com> [perma.cc/5CYK-QUXC]. The blog investigates a myriad of issues, inclusive 
of those related to mental health and punishment in Canada.  For decreased funding of psychiatric facilities see e.g. 
Cheryl Forchuk et al, “Housing, income support and mental health: Points of disconnection” (2007) 14:5 Health 
Research Policy and Systems 2. 
16 Sandy Simpson, “Mental Illness and the Prison System,” Centre for Addition and Mental Health (2019), online: 
<www.camh.ca/en/camh-news-and-stories/mental-illness-and-the-prison-system> [perma.cc/BNQ8-SB2H]. 
17 Note that mental health alerts do not confirm a diagnosed illness. Rather, they are used to trigger a diagnostic 
process. See Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre Quarterly Trends Analysis (6 June 2017), online: 
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/OttawaCarletonDetentionCentreTaskForce/OCDCTaskForce–
QuarterlyTrendsAnalysis.html> [perma.cc/TVQ4-XLWF]. 
18 Advocates for prison abolition tend to use the term “prisoner” in place of “inmate” because the latter has its 
origins in institutionalized psychiatric facilities and implies that people have an inherent quality in need of fixing.  
The term prisoner in used in place of inmate to reject this ideology.   
19 Diane Kelsall, “Cruel and usual punishment: solitary confinement in Canadian prisons” (2014) 186:18 CMAJ 
1345. 
20 Acts governing use of segregation are explored in more detail in the following section. Federal and provincial 
legislation on administrative and punitive segregation agree on these points.   
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example, anything that “in the opinion of the Superintendent” constitutes a safety concern is 
sufficient to justify segregating prisoners.21 Under these regimes, people with mental health 
issues are more likely to experience segregation.22 Despite a large body of empirical data that 
clearly indicates that solitary confinement is detrimental to mental health, segregation is a 
common response to for prisoners at risk of self-harm.23 As the report of Howard Sapers, then 
Ontario’s Independent Advisor of Corrections Reform noted, “[t]hose who have been flagged as 
having potential or confirmed suicide risk or mental illness are disproportionately placed in 
segregation, and once there tend to stay longer than the rest of the segregated population.”24 
Further troubling are statistics that show that the average number of days spent in segregation for 
both prisoners who have been flagged with mental health alerts and those who are at risk of 
suicide was fifteen or higher.25 According to what is known as the “Mandela Rules” provided by 
the United Nations, anything more than fifteen days of segregation amounts to torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.26 Although the Canadian state was a member of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, which adopted the Mandela Rules, the rules yield no binding 
consequence should Canada directly contravene them. Unfortunately, a lack of meaningful 
oversight of incarceration in Canada has meant that many issues around the use of segregation 
have not investigated until tragedies occurred. Some of the major cases on solitary confinement 
that have shone the public spotlight on Ontario institutions are provided below in order to situate 
the introduction of Bill C-83 within the contemporary socio-legal political landscape.  
II. A DECADE OF ABUSE  
 
Domestic and international pressures to address the ongoing harms of solitary confinement in 
Ontario have been mounting for several years now. Starting with the tragic death of Ashley 
Smith, major legal battles against the use of solitary confinement for prisoners with mental 
health issues have frequented media headlines.27 In this section, an overview of recent leading 
cases and their impacts are discussed to provide an understanding of the path that has led towards 
the introduction of Bill C-83 and the support for and opposition to it. For clarity, Appendix B 
provides a timeline of these events.   
 
21 Ministry of Correctional Services Act, RSO 1990, c M-22 at s 34. 
22 Rachelle Laroque, “Segregation Literature Review,” Independent Review of Ontario Corrections (January 2017), 
online: 
<www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/sites/default/files/content/mcscs/docs/Segregation%20Literature%20Review%20ENGLI
SH%20FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/T42A-3DE9].  
23 Sapers, supra note 4 and Ottawa Detention Quarterly, supra note 17.   
24 Sapers, supra note 4.   
25 Ibid.   
26 For a more fulsome explanation on the Mandela Rules, see Part III Federal and Provincial Legislative Reforms, 
also see The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) 
online: <www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Nelson_Mandela_Rules-E-ebook.pdf> 
[perma.cc/3DA4-EYSR]. 
27 Although this article uses the Ashley Smith Inquest as a starting point to analyze ongoing issues of segregation 
and mental health in Canada, this issue has been tackled by scholars and activists for many years prior to the Smith 
Inquest. See Michael Jackson, “Reflection on 40 Years of Advocacy to End the Isolation of Canadian Prisoners” 
(2015) 4:1 Cdn J Hum Rts  57.   
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 Ashley Smith was a youth when she first became incarcerated in a Nova Scotia 
correctional facility.28 Ashley suffered from mental health issues that were exacerbated by long 
stays in solitary confinement and was eventually sent to Grand Valley Institution, a federal 
prison in Ontario.29 While in a segregation there, Ashley died by suicide, as prison guards 
watched through a camera.30 They had been instructed not to enter the room until she was no 
longer breathing.31 News of this event became public, sparking national media attention and an 
inquest into her death.32 In 2013, the inquest rendered 104 recommendations, including banning 
indefinite solitary confinement.33   
 As the inquest into Ashley Smith’s death was concluding, a legal proceeding in a 
different matter was brought against an Ontario jail. Christina Jahn, a woman living with mental 
health issues and suffering from cancer, was subjected to more than 200 consecutive days in 
solitary confinement.34 The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) intervened in her claim 
against Ontario’s Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS), seeking a 
consent order for public interest remedies.35 Due to Jahn’s eventual settlement with MCSCS, 
many of the intimate details of her experience are not in the public record. However, a lengthy 
consent order has been made public, which states the terms that outline how segregation may be 
lawfully exercised.36 In the consent order, there are notable provisions that indicate that the 
segregation of prisoners with mental health issues is prohibited and that no more than sixty 
aggregate days of segregation is allowed in a 365-day period.37  
Public attention to these and other events led to an independent review of Ontario 
Corrections, concluding in what is now known as the Howard Sapers Report. In this 2017 report, 
several recommendations, echoing those of the Jahn Settlement and Ashley Smith Inquest, are 
provided. Most prominent of these recommendations are three points found in Recommendation 
3.1 prohibiting the use of segregation for mentally ill prisoners, prohibiting placement in 
segregation for more than fifteen days, and limiting aggregate days to no more than sixty in a 
one-year period.38 
Given the publicity of the Ashley Smith Inquest, the Jahn Settlement, and the Howard Sapers 
Report, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the use of segregation for prisoners with 
mental health issues in Ontario has since been eradicated. Unfortunately, however, at the 
provincial level the Jahn Settlement Order was violated in 2017, which led to a subsequent 2018 
order. Shortly thereafter, Bill 6 was introduced at the Ontario legislature and Bill C-83 was 
 
28 Jennifer Kilty & Rebecca Bromwich, “Introduction: Law, Vulnerability, and Segregation: What Have We Learned 




32 Ibid.  
33 Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death of Ashley Smith (19 December 2013). Note that due to procedural conflicts 
the first inquest did not begin until 2011, and was eventually terminated.   
34 Segregation and mental health in Ontario’s prisons: Jahn v Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Ontario Human 
Rights Commission, online: <www.ohrc.on.ca/en/segregation-and-mental-health-ontario’s-prisons-jahn-v-ministry-community-safety-
and-correctional> [perma.cc/G7B2-G4SX]. 
35 Ibid.   
36 “Appendix A” depicts the oversight of segregation for mentally ill prisoners at ODCD, resulting from this order. 
37 Public Interest Remedies: Schedule A in the matter of: Christina Nadine Jahn v Her Majesty the Queen in Right 
of Ontario, As Represented By The Minister Of Community Safety And Correctional Services 24 September 2013. 
38 Sapers, supra note 4.   
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introduced into Parliament.39 Since the introduction of these two Bills, an inquest into the death 
of Cas Geddes, a stay of proceedings for Adam Capay, and a class action brought forward be the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), have been at the forefront of media attention.   
As the introduction of this article describes, Geddes was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia when he was held in solitary confinement at OCDC, where he died by suicide in 
February of 2017.40 A few months later, the public learned that Adam Capay, a youth at the time 
he was first imprisoned, had been held in solitary confinement in a federal prison in Ontario for 
more than four years.41 Less than a month later, in March of 2019, an Ontario Court of Appeal 
decision in Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Canada (Attorney General),(CCLA) 
condemned the use of segregation for prisoners with mental health issues. Although the court 
declined to issue a specific remedy on mental health,42 it did make an important declaration that 
“administrative segregation longer than 15 consecutive days as provided for in ss. 31-37 of the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act violates s. 12 of the Charter and cannot be justified 
under s. 1.”43 As a caveat to the Court’s conclusion, it accepted the Attorney General’s request 
for a further extension of time to allow the legislative process with respect to Bill C-83 to 
conclude.44 This was significant because it was the first instance where the Ontario Court of 
Appeal had explicitly acknowledged the harms of fifteen consecutive days of segregation, in 
agreement with the well-established Mandela Rules, mentioned briefly above and discussed 
more fully in the following section.   
 
III. FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE REFORMS  
 
As the above cases illustrate, both federal prisons and provincial jails in Ontario are experiencing 
substantial pressures to reform or abolish solitary confinement in its current form, particularly for 
prisoners with mental health issues. Arguably, one of the barriers to actualizing change in 
Canadian carceral institutions is the existence of parallel but disparate legislative powers 
governing them. In this section, differing approaches to legislative reform in federal and 
provincial institutions in Ontario are contrasted against the backdrop of international law. 45 
As outlined in the introductory section, federal prisons operate to incarcerate those 
sentenced to more than two years and provincial jails are used to house those awaiting trial or 
who are sentenced to less than two years on incarceration. The majority (69 per cent) of those 
detained in Ontario jails are held on remand, awaiting trial.46 The notable results of this two-
 
39 Bill C-83, supra note 9. 
40 Crawford, supra note 3. 
41 Patrick White, “Judge issues stay in case of Adam Capay, who spent years in solitary confinement,” Globe and 
Mail (28 January, 2019), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-judge-issues-stay-in-adam-capay-
case/> [perma.cc/N4RN-SLAK]. 
42 2019 ONCA 243 at para 66. An appeal by the Attorney General of Canada to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
subsequently abandoned. 
43 Ibid at para 150.  
44 Ibid at para 47.  
45 Jails hold those serving less than two years, but they also hold all prisoners awaiting sentencing which means that 
all prisoners spend time in a jail. All prisoners in Canada will spend time in a jail, but not all will be incarcerated in 
a prison. This means that legislation which might abolish segregation in prisons while the practice may legitimately 
remain in jails. While the reverse is also true, the gap is less for jail reform as many persons in jails will never enter 
a prison.   
46 Statistics Canada, “Adult and Youth Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2017/2018” (9 May 2019), online: < 
www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2019001/article/00010-eng.htm> [perma.cc/C2ZC-SKEJ]. The approach 
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tiered system of incarceration are present in myriad ways. In addition to the complexity in 
addressing conditions of confinement presented by the separate and distinct laws governing 
them, many organizations working with prisoners and prisoners themselves are acutely aware of 
the lack of resources made available in jails on the basis that people in them are not in need of 
rehabilitation due to the uncertainty of their guilt.47 Despite such differences, a commonality 
shared by both federal and provincial detention is the use of solitary confinement as a tool for 
regulation of prisoners. The legislative controls governing these processes are outlined below, 
with particular attention to Bill C-83.  
The recently adopted Bill C-83 amends the federal Correctional and Conditional Release 
Act (CCRA),48 which provides rules on the use of segregation in federal prisons. The provincial 
Correctional Services and Reintegration Act (CSRA)49 and regulations of the Ministry of 
Correctional Services Act (MCSA)50 establish a similar but distinct set of discretionary powers 
on the use of segregation in Ontario jails. Bill 6, the Correctional Services Transformation Act,51 
which repeals existing powers over segregation in the MCSA and CSRA in order to substantially 
limit its use, received royal assent on 7 May 2018.52 However, since the Conservative 
government came into power in June of 2018, the Bill has not been listed with forthcoming 
Ontario Proclamations, meaning that it is not scheduled to come into force and could remain 
dormant for up to ten years.53 As such, Bill 6 is on the cusp of implementing reforms that could 
see a significant reform of solitary confinement as it exists in Ontario today while newly 
implemented reforms of Bill C-83 are being introduced across Ontario-based prisons. 
Interestingly, these parallel Bills adopt very different and, in some ways, conflicting approaches 
to segregation reform.   
It is important to note that both Bill C-83 and the Bill 6 emerged following years of 
advocacy that saw the development and adoption of the Mandela Rules by the United Nations in 
2015. The purpose of this set of rules is to set a minimum standard of treatment for prisoners 
internationally. In addition to minimum standards on the use of solitary confinement, food 
provision, medical treatment, conditions of climate, and administration of records and 
overcrowding are outlined by these rules in order to prevent harms that have been established as 
a direct result of incarceration. Specifically, Rule 45(2) prohibits the use of solitary confinement 
 
adopted in this article sees all usage of solitary confinement as harmful, regardless of a verdict of guilt or innocence. 
While the disparity in the number of people found guilty and on remand is helpful to providing context to the 
division between federal and provincial institutions, it is not meant to assert that the degree to which a person has 
become criminalized renders them more of less deserving for what the Mandela Rules have deemed to be torture or 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. 
47 Speight et al, “Jail Accountability and Information Hotline Quarterly Report” (March 2019), online: <https://cp-
ep.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Jail-Hotline_Q2-Report_Final.pdf> [perma.cc/SN2H-CKC7] at 15.  
48 Corrections and Conditional Release Act SC 1992, c 20 at s 31. 
49 Correctional Services and Reintegration Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 6, Sched 2. 
50 Ministry of Correctional Services Act RSO 1990, c M-22 at s 34. 
51 Bill 6, Correctional Services Transformation Act, 2018, SO 2018, c 6. 
52 Appendix B provides a helpful overview of the federal and provincial legislative reform timelines that will be 
discussed in this section. 
53 Bills passed by the Ontario Legislature may require proclamation by the Lieutenant Governor before coming into 
effect, even after royal assent is received. This is true of Bill 6. Currently, Bill 6 has no listed date to receive 
proclamation. Bills essentially sit in limbo for up to ten years before action is required, meaning that although Bill 6 
has received royal assent, it may not come into effect for several years. Critics have suggested that the Ford 
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for prisoners “with mental or physical disabilities when their conditions would be exacerbated by 
such measures.”54 While Canada is a member of the General Assembly, which adopted this set of 
rules in 2015, counsel for the Attorney General of Ontario later took the position with respect to 
solitary confinement that: “It’s not that they’re irrelevant, they are relevant, and they are a source 
of information … that you can look to, to assist you in determining what you conclude are the 
constitutional obligations.”55 In other words, the Canadian state is in agreement that such 
minimum standards should exist, but objects to being held accountable to meeting them. No 
domestic or international tribunal exists to enforce the Mandela Rules, which allows Canada and 
Ontario to symbolically agree to these standards without accountability.  
Following recommendations made by the Howard Sapers Report, Bill 6 (the Correctional 
Services Transformation Act) takes a radically different approach than federal Bill C-83 to 
solitary confinement in Ontario jails. The Bill overturns pre-existing discretionary powers of jail 
staff by setting hard deadlines on the amount of time a prisoner can be placed in solitary 
confinement, setting the cap at fifteen days, in compliance with the Mandela Rules and the 
Ontario Court of Appeal decision in CCLA.56 The number of allowable aggregate days in a 365-
day period is set at sixty, following the Jahn Settlement agreement and the Howard Sapers’ 
Report recommendations.57 In further compliance of these recommendations, Bill 6 prohibits the 
use of segregation for prisoners with mental health issues.58 The Bill 6 definition of segregation 
remains the same as it previously was: “any type of custody where an inmate is highly restricted 
in movement and associate with others for 22 hours or more a day.”59 This definition might have 
been trivial but for the introduction of Bill C-83, which hinges its reforms on the number of 
hours spent in solitude. 
Unlike Bill 6, which approaches the ongoing harms of solitary confinement by limiting 
discretion of its use, Bill C-83 attempts to address the issue by changing the way that solitary is 
experienced, without providing a hard limit on the frequency or overall duration of its 
application. Rather, Bill C-83 introduces what are called “structured intervention units” in place 
of solitary confinement cells.60 One of the central features of these units is that prisoners must 
spend at least four hours a day outside of them, two of which must allow for social interaction.61 
While this does mark a welcomed improvement to the twenty-two hours of solitary confinement 
permitted prior to the implementation of Bill C-83, it is quite a leap to suggest, as the 
government does, that the remaining twenty hours no longer constitutes solitary confinement. 
Despite language in the Mandela Rules and as defined by the CCLA decision, which defines 
solitary confinement as twenty-two hours a day of confinement, it is well-established that the 
harms to mental health resultant from solitary confinement are predicated on sensory 
deprivation, and such harms are not removed by providing two fewer daily hours of sensory 
 
54 Mandela Rules, supra note 26 at 45(2). 
55 Sunny Dhillon, “UN solitary-confinement rules aren't binding in Canadian prisons, Attorney-General lawyer 
says,” Globe and Mail, (31 August 2017), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/un-solitary-
confinement-rules-dont-apply-to-canadian-prisons-attorney-general-lawyer-says/article36142330/> 
[perma.cc/MFP2-ZPAB]. 
56 Bill C-83, supra note 9. 
57 Sapers, supra note 4 and Bill C-83, supra note 9. 
58 Bill 6, supra note 51 at s 65(3)(c), (d).  
59 Ibid at Part I.  
60 Bill c-83, supra note 9 at s 31.1(1). 
61 Ibid at s 36. 
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deprivation.62 It is the absence of sensory stimulation for prolonged periods of time that erodes 
mental health and is known to cause “appetite and sleep disturbances, anxiety, panic, rage, loss 
of control, paranoia, hallucinations and self-mutilations.”63 Although two less hours a day 
experiencing sensory deficit may partially mitigate the severity of harms caused by solitary 
confinement, it does not eradicate them.64 As such, while Bill C-83 may provide the potential for 
solitary confinement to cause slightly less harm to mental health, the scope of how much less 
harm, if any less at all, has yet to be fully assessed.  
Unlike Bill 6 which strictly prohibits solitary confinement of prisoners with mental health 
issues, the confinement of mentally ill prisoners alone in “structured intervention units” for 
twenty hours a day is allowable under Bill C-83 with the provision that prisoners are visited daily 
by a registered health care professional.65 More specifically, section 37.1(2) states that mental 
health assessments, performed by a registered health care professional, will take place “within 24 
hours after the inmate’s transfer into the structured intervention unit” and a visit to the inmate 
will occur “at least once every day by a registered health care professional.”66 Should the 
outcome of a mental health assessment be that “confinement of an inmate in a structured 
intervention unit is having detrimental impacts on the inmate’s health,” the institutional head 
determines whether conditions in the unit should be altered or whether the inmate should remain 
in the unit.67 Should the institutional head decide that the prisoner must remain in the unit, 
despite the ongoing harms, this decision will then be reviewed by an external committee, 
consisting of a staff of the Service, who will be provided information by a different healthcare 
professional that they may opt to reject.68 In the event that the committee determines that a 
prisoner should remain in the unit or that the conditions of confinement in the unit should not be 
altered, an independent external decision maker shall be appointed to make a final 
determination.69 The only qualification for this decision maker is that they have “knowledge of 
administrative decision-making processes in general.”70 All this is to say that should a mental 
health professional find that a prisoner is experiencing mental health harms so significant that 
they must be taken out of a structured intervention unit, a multi-layered bureaucratic process will 
begin. At no point in this process is any action required that would treat the harms caused by 
solitary confinement. Rather, a healthcare professional, many of whom are barely able to 
complete daily tasks due to such heavy workloads,71 must advocate to the institutional head on 
behalf of the prisoner that they be removed from circumstances which are well-established to 
cause harms to mental health. For the duration of this decision-making process, the prisoner will 
continue to be held in the structured intervention unit/solitary cell.  
 
62 Laura Dellazizzo et al, “Is mental illness associated with placement into solitary confinement in correctional 
settings? A systematic review and meta‐analysis” (2020) 29:4 Int J Mental Health Nursing 576. 
63 Craig Haney, “Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement” (2003) 49:1 Crime 
and Delinquency 124 at 130. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Bill C-83, supra note 9 at s 37.1 (1) & (2). 
66 Ibid at s 37.1(2). 
67 Ibid at s 37.11, 37.2, 37.3. 
68 Ibid at s 37.31(1) and 37.1(3). 
69 Ibid at s 37.81. 
70 Ibid at s 37.6(2). 
71 Martha Paynter, “Nurse: we should support prisoners’ demands for better healthcare,” Halifax Examiner (24 
August 2018), online: <www.halifaxexaminer.ca/province-house/nurse-we-should-support-prisoners-demands-for-
better-health-care/> [perma.cc/PZ84-T76G]. 
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An inherently worrisome feature of Bill C-83 is that the Commission “may designate a 
penitentiary or any area in a penitentiary to be a structured intervention unit.”72 The critique that 
Senator Pate and other prisoners’ rights advocates have advanced is that structured intervention 
units will likely be the exact same units that were previously named solitary confinement cells.73 
With absolutely no required changes to the cells, it is unclear what will differentiate them. Had 
Bill C-83 included requirements for these units (windows, access to literature, TV and radio, size 
requirements, access to lighting options, et cetera) there may have been some optimism around 
the statutory amendments.   
While Bill C-83 has the potential to alter how prisoners experience solitary confinement 
in Canada, it falls short of meeting recommendations of the Howard Sapers Report and distorts 
the length of time that is spent in structured intervention units such that the decision of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in CCLA and the requirements set out by the UN in the Mandela rules 
appear to have been met since prisoners spend two fewer hours daily in solitary confinement. 
Yet, Bill C-83 only requires the review of solitary confinement in structured intervention units 
after thirty days, double the maximum set by the Mandela rules and the decision by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in CCLA.74 Further, the shift towards monitoring mental health does not prevent 
the harms that are caused by placing prisoners with mental health issues in solitary confinement. 
Rather, it retroactively engages prisoners in what could become a lengthy battle to be removed 
from solitary confinement conditions actively causing harms to mental health.  
As evidenced by the experiences of Cas Geddes, Ashley Smith, Christina Jahn, and 
Adam Capay,75 prisoners who complain of mental health concerns or exhibit potentially violent 
forms of distress caused by mental health issues are known to be placed in segregation as a 
response. The result is a cyclical effect of exacerbating the underlying mental health issues 
causing the use of segregation by implementing terms of segregation. In addition to removing 
prisoners from solitary confinement, an effective reform must also treat their mental health and 
the effects caused by prolonged solitary confinement.76 Daily visits by healthcare professionals77 
only react to harms directly caused by segregation without providing treatment or preventing 
them from occurring. The only “treatment” required by the Bill is the removal of prisoners from 
solitary confinement should the potentially lengthy process, outlined through ss 31-37, be 
successful. Given the large body of data regarding the severe harms to mental health caused by 
solitary confinement, and international rules limiting its use, this can hardly be considered 
treatment.  
Although Bill C-83 does not dramatically alter the conditions of solitary confinement or 
the broad powers of correctional staff to implement it, correctional officers’ unions have raised 
concerns that without the power to completely isolate prisoners, instances of violence will rise.78 
 
72 Bill C-83, supra note 9, s 31. 
73 Pate, supra note 11.  
74 Bill C-83, supra note 9, s 37.4. 
75 It must be noted that Black, Indigenous, and racialized people are far more likely to experience criminalization, 
incarceration, and solitary confinement while incarcerated. The cases selected in this article are those which have 
received the most public attention. With the exception of Adam Capay, all are white. The correlation between 
receiving public attention for harms experienced while incarcerated and being white is acknowledged.  
76 This may include behavioural therapy, medication, or gradual, supported reintegration. However, it must be noted 
that treatment of mental health in Ontario prisons and jails is sorely lacking.   
77 Bill C-83, supra note 9 at 37.1(2). 
78 Glenda Luyems, “Violence in prisons will rise with the end of solitary confinement, warns guards’ union,” 
Vancouver Sun (21 October 2018), online: <vancouversun.com/news/local-news/violence-in-prisons-will-rise-with-
the-end-of-solitary-confinement-warns-guards-union> [perma.cc/E3A3-BXLL]. 
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However, Bill C-83 maintains these powers through the provision that the institutional head, as 
well as the internal committee, have the right to supersede decisions with respect to mental 
health concerns should removal from solitary confinement “jeopardize the safety of the inmate or 
any other person or the security of the penitentiary” or “interfere with an investigation that could 
lead to a criminal charge.”79 As such, correctional staff have the power to override mental health 
concerns and implement solitary confinement through the use of structured intervention units 
where safety is of concern.80 
On its face, Bill C-83 falls short of meeting recommendations made by the Howard 
Sapers’ Report, the Ashley Smith Inquest, the Jahn Settlement, the Adam Capay stay order, and 
the CCLA decision, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal, as noted earlier, clearly articulates that 
“administrative segregation longer than 15 consecutive days … violates s. 12 of the Charter.”81 
As Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale suggested prior to the Bill’s passage, the Liberal 
government believes Bill C-83 meets the Ontario Court of Appeal orders by eliminating solitary 
confinement altogether.82 As discussed earlier, the approach of the Bill misses the mark by 
reorganizing solitary confinement into structured intervention units, which are likely to 
perpetuate existing problems, particularly for people with mental health issues. While the Bill 
provides for less time to be spent in these units, reducing hours from twenty-two to twenty, this 
decrease is not likely to dramatically reduce the negative impacts of solitary confinement on 
mental health. Rather, it skirts the legal definitions of solitary confinement which have been 
named by the Mandela Rules and the CCLA decision to be twenty hours. Drawing from 
contemporary literature on topics of solitary confinement and mental health, the following 
section of this article investigates potential consequences of Bill C-83’s future implementation. 
 
IV. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF BILL C-83 
 
In a critique of CCRA oversight of the use of segregation in women’s prisons in Canada, Lisa 
Kerr highlights instances where strict readings of the Act’s provisions around discretionary 
powers over the administration of segregation have been applied as a tool to legitimize internal 
institutional policies that conflict with the Act’s overarching goal of supporting rehabilitation.83 
In this section, Bill C-83 is considered in light of Kerr’s analysis of the limitations of the Act in 
providing meaningful oversight of its administrative applications of solitary confinement to 
internal prison policies. While Kerr’s work reveals the limitations of legislation, the work of 
Debra Parkes, a leading scholar in Canadian prison law and solitary confinement, highlights the 
failure of Canadian courts in addressing the harms of segregation for mentally ill prisoners, 
effectively ignoring UN obligations under the Mandela Rules.84 Parkes’ work on the topic will 
 
79 Bill C-83, supra note 9 at s 37.41(1). 
80 While the position of guards and the CSC with respect to safety is relevant, I have opted not to specifically 
highlight these positions in detail because their voices are already centred and privileged in conversations around 
legislation that impacts the mental health of prisoners, who have been stripped of agency or control over their own 
circumstances of incarceration.   
81 CCLA, supra note 42. 
82 Editorial Board, “Ottawa now has even more reasons to fix solitary confinement,” Toronto Star online: 
<www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/2019/04/01/ottawa-now-has-even-more-reasons-to-fix-solitary-
confinement.html > [perma.cc/9AZ7-GL6H]. 
83 Lisa Coleen Kerr, “The Origins of Unlawful Prison Policies” (2015) 4:1 Cdn J Hum Rts 89 at 93. 
84 Debra Parkes, “Solitary Confinement, Prisoner Litigation, and the Possibility of a Prison Abolitionist Lawyering 
Ethic” (2017) 32:2 CJLS 165 at 167. 
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inform the analysis of Bill C-83 in light of the recent CCLA decision. Finally, the work of 
Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster, analyzing political influence over prison policies in Canada, 
is considered to discern potential broader outcomes.85  
Kerr’s analysis of segregation protocols developed under the CCRA prior to the Bill C-83 
amendments suggests the importance of assessing the extent to which those responsible for the 
Act’s implementation may manipulate its language to support policies that conflict with the 
overarching goal of limiting the use of segregation. Kerr also warns that the space that the CCRA 
is implemented within—prisons and jails—must also be considered for their inaccessibility to 
public scrutiny.86 Given that the Bill C-83 amendments will see mandatory reforms from the use 
of segregation (twenty-two hours per day) to “structured intervention units” (twenty hour per 
day), it is inevitable that these institutions will be required to modify existing protocols. The 
discretion contained in sections 31 and 34 of Bill C-83 suggests that deeply troubling outcomes 
are possible. For example, as noted earlier section 31 provides that the Commissioner “may 
designate a penitentiary or any area in a penitentiary to be a structured intervention unit.”87 Many 
prisons and jails in Canada are several decades old and struggling to manage overcrowding and 
understaffing problems.88 Providing such discretion on the space that can be deemed a 
“structured intervention unit” may even regress the current state of segregation cells. While it is 
entirely possible that structured intervention units will be the exact same units previously used as 
solitary confinement cells, it is also possible that new or restructured jails and prisons may use 
even smaller or less appealing spaces as “structured intervention units,” which more 
conveniently accommodate four hours of daily release. Similarly troubling are the continued 
discretionary powers afforded in decisions regarding the use and continued application of 
solitary confinement for prisoners, which require reassessment only after thirty days, should 
mental health assessments not give rise to further administrative action.  
For prisoners with mental health issues, Bill C-83 does little to improve conditions. 
Instead of preventing the many known harms resulting from placing those with mental health 
issues into solitary confinement, the Bill increases visitation by health care professionals, with 
very little obligation on such professionals or correctional staff to take positive action.89 Action 
is required by staff members only if they believe confinement in a structured intervention unit is 
having detrimental effects, such as a prisoner committing an act of self-harm, refusing to interact 
socially, a drug overdose, or some other medical emergency.90 But this required “action” consists 
only of referring the prisoner’s case to those responsible for administering health care. Although 
monitoring of mental health is increased, it does not necessarily increase the medical care 
required to improve it. Rather, health care professionals are likely to observe as the harms of 
solitary confinement take effect on prisoners, without support for action until one of the medical 
emergencies listed above has already occurred.  
 
85 Anthony Doob & Cheryl Webster, “Maintaining our Balance: Trends in Imprisonment Policies in Canada” in 
Karim Ismaili, Jane Sprott & Kim Varma, eds, Canadian Criminal Justice Policy: Contemporary Perspectives 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
86 Kerr, supra note 83 at 92. 
87 Bill C-83, supra note 9 and s 37.11.  
88 Valérie Ouellet et al, “Overcrowding, understaffing and 'culture of violence' rampant at notorious Ontario jail: 
lawyer” (2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/emdc-systemic-issues-adam-kargus-anthony-george-1.4427044> 
[perma.cc/VG2L-NPG4]. 
89 Bill C-83, supra note 9 at s 37.1(2). 
90 Ibid at s 37.11. 
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Given the trend of Correctional Service of Canada’s apparent (CSC) reluctance to take 
action, Parkes has criticized courts for taking a “hands off” approach to correctional decision-
making, particularly in the matter of mental health and segregation.91 Parkes describes the 1975 
decision, McCann v The Queen, as a pivotal moment where the Federal Court first acknowledged 
harms resultant from solitary confinement, yet does little to advance change. Specifically, the 
court ruled that extended use of solitary confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment 
in contravention of section 2(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Several important factors should 
be considered in reflecting on this case. First, no subsequent legal reforms followed from the 
decision. While the court felt it should give practical guidance with respect to institutional 
practices, the decision did not render a specific piece of legislation or policy in contravention of 
the Bill of Rights, only actions undertaken at the institution.  Secondly, the decision reacted to the 
harms that prisoners experienced well after such harms had taken effect and forever changed 
their lives, exemplifying the reactive nature of courts which often does little to prevent harm. 
Notably, the prisoners in this case experienced decades of abuse while in solitary confinement 
and a plethora of horrific suicides occurred before any acknowledgement took place.92 The 
harms that were endured by these prisoners were addressed far too late, with many having 
suffered irreversible harms to mental health. Finally, the prisoners in this case were only able to 
access legal support and resources on a pro bono basis following a very public escape by one 
prisoner who leaked information with respect to his inhumane treatment to the media. For the 
majority of prisoners, financial resources to access legal support will entirely prevent any 
meaningful action or remedy.  
Decades later, BobbyLee Worm, an Indigenous woman incarcerated at the age of 
nineteen who experienced years of solitary confinement was successful in a claim against the 
institution she was held in. As Parkes explains, however, despite a settlement which abolished 
the protocol that had enabled Worm’s prolonged solitary confinement, young Indigenous women 
at the institution continued to experience the same result.93 Although courts, in this case, did 
react to policies enabling the use of solitary confinement, there was no continued oversight to 
monitor compliance. Similarly to the McCann decision, Worm faced extreme harms before the 
court acknowledged wrongdoing. Additionally, had it not been for the availability of pro bono 
legal resources, Worm would not have had access to any remedy at all. Such a “hands off” 
approach by the courts is especially problematic considering Kerr’s work which establishes that 
internal policies of correctional institutions are often not reflective of the CCRA mandate. The 
result is that many prisoners continue to experience the harms resultant from solitary 
confinement, despite legal decisions which have attempted to eradicate its harmful use.  
Parkes also discusses more recent cases where applications of habeus corpus were 
brought to prevent the harms of solitary confinement. Specifically, in the Bacon v Surrey Pretrial 
Services Centre (Warden) decision a BC Superior Court deemed the conditions of solitary 
confinement to be “significantly threatening to psychological integrity” and “deplorable in any 
civilized society, and certainly unworthy of ours.”94 Unfortunately, however, the Court refused to 
characterize segregation as cruel and unusual punishment per se.95 The recent CCLA decision 
 
91 Parkes, supra note 84. 
92 McCann v The Queen, [1976] 1 FC 570. 
93 Parkes, supra note 84 at 178. 
94 2010 BCSC 805. 
95 Ibid at 174. 
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exemplifies a similar pattern in judicial reluctance to address mental health in Canadian prisons. 
Here, the Court states: 
 
In principle, I agree with the CCLA that those with mental illness should not be 
placed in administrative segregation. However, the evidence does not provide the 
court with a meaningful way to identify those inmates whose particular mental 
illnesses are of such a kind as to render administrative segregation for any length of 
time cruel and unusual. I take some comfort in my view that a cap of 15 days would 
reduce the risk of harm to inmates who suffer from mental illness.96 
 
As Parkes demonstrates, the reluctance of courts to address mental health and segregation 
directly results in severe ongoing harms. The implementation of Bill C-83 continues this trend by 
ignoring the known harms caused by solitary confinement and instead placing minimal 
restrictions upon its use.  
These minimal restrictions, coupled with a “hands off” approach to implementation and 
oversight, yield the result that Parkes’ 2017 research warns Canadian legal professionals about. 
Parkes suggests legal professionals ought to be cautious of legal decisions sparking legislative 
reforms to solitary confinement, following trends in American reforms in the 1970s, which saw 
“states buil[d] new solitary confinement units that met the minimum standards for space, light, 
and other amenities required by courts.”97 Such action is arguably exactly the situation that Bill 
C-83 has created by implementing only the minimum standards required to absolve government 
of accountability, while still not addressing the overarching harms caused by lacing people with 
mental health issues in solitary confinement. In doing so, the Bill threatens to put much of the 
work of lawyers advocating against solitary confinement for prisoners with mental health issues 
to waste. This is because in preparing the evidentiary record, the many expert reports compiled 
for cases like the CCLA class action and Bacon relied on practices of segregation that permit 
twenty-two hours of solitary confinement per day. As noted, Bill C-83 permits twenty hours/day 
in “structured intervention units,” with two mandatory hours of socialization, and this may well 
require the gathering of new data and analyses. This exemplifies the sort of challenges that 
Parkes describes in Canadian jurisprudence to completely abolish segregation for mentally ill 
prisoners. 
Doob and Webster describe the shift in policies since the federal election of Harper’s 
Conservative government in 2006 as one following a punitive vision of criminal justice.98 The 
inclination of Conservative governments towards tough on crime and pro-punishment initiatives 
is an important consideration when assessing broader political implications of Bill C-83, 
particularly at the Ontario Legislature. Ford’s Conservative government in Ontario, among many 
other cuts, has not renewed Howard Sapers’ contract, leaving the position on jail oversight 
vacant. As discussed above, the proclamation of Bill 6, which would set a cap of fifteen days on 
segregation, has also been indefinitely shelved. No information is available on when the 
Lieutenant Governor might address it. Now that Bill C-83 is federal law, the logic it applies (of 
structured intervention units rather than solitary confinement cells) could be utilized by the Ford 
administration as justification to repeal the forthcoming reforms of Bill 6, effectively reversing a 
decade of advocacy for reform in this area. Further, Bill C-83 provides a similar justification for 
 
96 CCLA, supra note 42 at para 66. 
97 Parkes, supra note 84 at 173. 
98 Doob & Webster, supra note 85 at 314.  
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other provinces struggling to address issues of solitary confinement and mental health by 




The parallel, yet distinct, layers of federal and provincial oversight of Ontario carceral 
institutions complicate advocacy aimed at preventing the harms resulting from segregating 
prisoners with mental health issues. Bill C-83 reforms create a dangerous precedent in which 
solitary confinement “under another name” (structured intervention units) is permitted to hold 
prisoners with mental health issues for otherwise unacceptable periods of time.99 Furthermore, 
the Bill conflates monitoring and responding to harms to mental health caused by solitary 
confinement with preventing or treating it. If such logic is applied to oversight of mental health 
in prisons more broadly, research and evidence suggests that increased harms will follow.100 In 
this crucial moment of prisoners’ justice reform, Bill C-83 threatens to undo many years of 
advocacy efforts and research predicated on the definition of solitary confinement as isolation for 
twenty-two hours, particularly in Ontario where the positive reforms of Bill 6 were on the cusp 
of being adopted. The CCLA decision will play a pivotal role in the future of solitary 
confinement in Canada, especially for those living with mental health issues. However, given the 
recent passage of Bill C-83, many of the arguments relied on by the CCLA are at risk of 
challenge, particularly given the Minister of Public Safety’s view that solitary confinement has 
been entirely eradicated.101 As such, it is proposed here that while Bill C-83 has the potential to 
reduce some of the harms to mental health caused by solitary confinement, it threatens to follow 
American trends in solitary confinement reforms and undo many years of advocacy by 
reorganizing similar conditions under another name and falsely concluding that solitary 









99 Bill C-83, supra note 9. 
100 Dellazizzo et al, supra note 62 and 63.   
101 Haney, supra note 82.   
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